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I. INTRODUCTION
The employment patterns of "nontraditional"' workers in
the United States show two conflicting characteristics. On the
one hand, researchers have observed a continuing increase in
the rate of participation of nontraditional workers at multiple
levels in the work force. For example, the proportion of women
white collar workers increased from twenty-two percent in the
late 1960s to forty-six percent in 1992.2 Similarly, the average
job tenure for nontraditional workers has also increased.3 For
example, although males in the thirty-five to forty-four year
old age group have experienced a small decline in job tenure,
women in the same group have seen increasing participation
in the high tenure categories.4
1. We use the word "nontraditional" to refer to workers that have in the past
had lower participation rates in the labor market. Although we primarily refer to
women and racial minorities, our arguments also apply to workers who are disabled
or older, who are also covered under federal antidiscrimination statutes similar to
Title VII such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1988), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V
1994).
2. Rochelle Sharpe, The Waiting Game, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1994, at Al.
3. See Paul Osterman, Internal Labor Markets in a Changing Environment:
Models and Evidence, in RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN INDusmIAL RELATIONS AND HUMAN
REsOuRcES 273, 278-79 (David Lewin et al. eds., 1992) (reporting an increase in
female employees who remain with the same employer for more than 6 to 16 years).
4. Id. at 280. Using data from the Current Population Survey, Professor
Osterman shows the following patterns regarding tenure of employment within an
organization:
Men 35-44 Years Old Women 35-44 Years Old
Tenure 1979 1988 1979 1988
0-2 22.7 28.2 44.8 39.3
3-5 15.9 18.0 22.1 20.6
6-10 20.4 19.4 17.2 20.1
11-15 20.5 15.1 9.6 11.2
16 15.3 18.6 6.1 8.7
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On the other hand, nontraditional workers have also expe-
rienced the phenomenon of the "glass ceiling."5 This glass ceil-
ing is a barrier that prevents women and minorities from mov-
ing to high level managerial positions of power and authority
within organizations.' The glass ceiling has recently been doc-
umented as existing at a lower level in organizations than
originally thought.7 One recent study of Fortune 1000 compa-
nies indicated that although about thirty-seven percent of em-
ployees are women and about fifteen percent are minorities,
only seventeen percent of all managers are women, and only
six percent of all managers are minorities.' At executive level
managerial positions the discrepancies are even larger: only
about six percent are women, and only three percent are mi-
norities.9
The advancement of women and minorities in the work
force, as illustrated by their increased labor force participation
numbers, has in part been attributed to the protection provid-
ed under Title VII.1' Title VII has been fairly successful in
eliminating barriers to entry into some positions previously
closed to women and minorities." Early efforts at combatting
discrimination were aimed at lower level, often entry level,
jobs, because they represented the greatest number of employ-
ment opportunities and had the smallest number of
5. The term "glass ceiling" appears to have been coined in the late 1980s. It
has been defined as a barrier that keeps women from rising above a certain level in
a corporation. ANN M. MORRISON ET AL., BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING: CAN WOMEN
REACH THE Top OF AMERICA'S LARGEST CORPORATIONS? xi-xiii (1987). The U.S. De-
partment of Labor has defined the glass ceiling as "those artificial barriers based on
attitudinal or organizational bias that prevent qualified individuals from advancing
upward in their organization." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A REPORT ON THE GLASS CEIL-
ING INITIATIVE 1 (1991).
6. Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions
of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 483-84 (1990) (arguing that while establishing
women in the work force was relatively easy, women have faced significant barriers
when attempting to secure high level jobs).
7. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 5, at 13.
8. Id. at 6. A recent survey conducted by the Wall Street Journal found that
women held less than one-third of all managerial jobs during 1992. Sharpe, supra
note 2, at Al, A10.
9. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 5, at 6. This report cites findings by
Korr;Ferry International and the UCLA Anderson Graduate School of Management
in KoRNWFERRY INTERNATIONAL'S EXECUTIVE PROFILE 1990: A SURVEY OF CORPORATE
LEADERS (1990), which concluded that from 1980 to 1990, there has been only a
slight increase in the representation of minorities and women in top executive posi-
tions of the nation's 1000 largest corporations.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
11. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95
HARV. L REV. 945, 947-48 (1982) (noting Title VII's success in fighting discrimina-
tion in lower level jobs, but also criticizing its failure in regard to upper level jobs).
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requirements for qualification, including education and experi-
ence. In particular, Title VII has helped reduce barriers that
prevent women and minorities from entering nontraditional
areas of employment.
If Title VII has been successful at the entry level, we
might expect it to be similarly successful in protecting women's
and minorities' interest in advancement to higher levels of
employment. Instead, however, Title VII has ineffectively dealt
with the glass ceiling problem. That is, Title VII has been less
successful at helping nontraditional workers move upward to
mid-level and upper level management positions within organi-
zations.'" Most occupations remain either gender- or minority-
segregated, or gender- or minority-stratified. 4 In elite profes-
sions in particular, women and minorities cluster at the lowest
level. 5 The reasons why Title VII has failed to facilitate up-
ward movement of nontraditional workers are the focus of this
Article.
We argue that a major factor explaining Title VII's failure
to deal with the glass ceiling problem is that advancement and
promotion decisions occur at a different market level than
entry level employment decisions. While entry level employ-
ment decisions operate for the most part in the external labor
market, advancement and promotion decisions tend to take
place in the internal labor market. We argue that Title VII, as
interpreted, does not provide a framework capable of dealing
with the problems nontraditional workers face within the con-
text of the internal labor market. The courts' interpretation of
Title VII has not been sufficiently sensitive to the subtle ways
in which women and minorities come to be excluded from mid-
level and upper level positions within organizations-ways so
subtle that employers themselves are not always aware of
them. As a result, nontraditional workers have entered inter-
nal labor markets with expectations of advancement, but when
12. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793-94 (1973)
(regarding employment of mechanics and lab technicians); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 427 (1971) (holding an employment scheme that relegated blacks to
the lowest paying and most menial jobs in violation of Title VII).
13. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW 161, 163 (1989) (noting that women have predominately remained in low
status, low paying, traditionally female-dominated vocations).
14. Id.; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 5, at 13-17; see Patricia A. Roos &
Barbara F. Reskin, Institutional Factors Contributing to Sex Segregation in the
Workplace, in SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATION, REME-
DIES 235, 256 (Barbara F. Reskin ed., 1984) (concluding that many barriers are in-
stitutionalized in the workplace and labor market).
15. RHODE, supra note 13, at 163.
1520 [Vol. 31:1517
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that advancement has not been forthcoming, Title VII has not
been useful in enforcing the internal labor market promise.
We first discuss how the internal labor market operates,
noting specific problems that can arise for nontraditional work-
ers. 6 We then argue that Title VII does not facilitate upward
movement of nontraditional workers in internal labor markets.
At the same time, because Title VII has allowed greater influx
of nontraditional workers from the external market into entry
level positions-in fact, has required it-it is now necessary for
frustrated nontraditional workers to avoid internal labor mar-
ket employers and to move into jobs and career opportunities
that rely on the external labor market. 7
II. LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT, PROMOTION, AND ADVANCEMENT
A. External and Internal Labor Markets
The external labor market (ELM) is where workers seek
new jobs by searching across many different firms for the best
conditions of employment. 8 ELMs are characterized by large
numbers of workers and large numbers of employers. 9 In
general, ELMs are considered relatively competitive due to the
mobility of workers and the competition among firms for these
new workers.' ° Discrimination can occur in the ELM, howev-
er, when factors such as lack of information, lack of mobility,
or an oversupply of labor exist. Discrimination is possible un-
der such conditions because the market is unable to serve as a
check that penalizes discriminatory behavior by employers.2'
Not all employment transactions, however, occur in the
ELM. As workers and firms establish ongoing relationships,
the ELM becomes less relevant.' Internal labor markets
(ILMs) are considered an alternative to the ELM. Traditional-
ly, the ILM has been defined in the economics literature as a
set of explicit or implicit agreements between a firm and its
workers.' These agreements incorporate various aspects of
16. Refer to Part III infra.
17. Refer to Parts III & IV infra.
18. Michael L Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collec-
tive Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting,
Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1356 (1988).
19. Id. at 1357.
20. Id.
21. See id. (noting that the external labor market is subject to normal supply
and demand economic forces).
22. Id. at 1357, 1359.
23. See generally Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of
1995] 1521
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the employment relationship such as rules governing wages,
working hours, promotion opportunities, and grievance proce-
dures.' Enforcement mechanisms can also be included in
these agreements, as well as provisions making the agreement
contingent on such future events as changes in the firm's prod-
uct market or changes in the macro economy.
ILMs arise because of the ELM's inability to deal with
employment transactions when there is a need for skills that
are specific to a firm? In such situations, ILMs provide an
alternative to exclusive reliance on the use of ELMsY By in-
ternalizing parts of the employment relationship, firms can
potentially encourage workers to make long-term investments
with them, which in turn produces technological and cost effi-
ciencies for the firm.
Central to the ILM rationale is the expectation that the
employee will be attached to the firm for a long period of time
and will have opportunities for advancement within that firm.
The employer would arguably not want to lose an employee
with specialized training because this would require the train-
ing of another employee and result in a corresponding loss in
productivity during the training period.' The employee, on
the other hand, will possess skills that are not readily trans-
ferable and will therefore be reluctant to leave employment
Internal Labor Markets, in THE ECONOMICS OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 86,
86-87 (Daniel J.B. Mitchell & Mahmood A. Zaidi eds., 1990). The development of the
ILM concept traces back to Clark Kerr, The Balkanization of Labor Markets, in LA-
BOR MOBILITY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 92, 101-02 (E. Wight Bakke ed., 1954),
who identified "ports of entry" inside firms and noted that these ports are the main
link between the external labor market and labor mobility within organizations.
24. One common example of explicit contracts are collective bargaining agree-
ments negotiated under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187
(1988 & Supp. V 1994), by the employer and the designated workers' representa-
tives.
25. Wachter & Wright, supra note 23, at 86.
26. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 1358-64 (distinguishing between
firm-specific skills that are not easily transferable to other firms and general skills
that are easily transferable across firms within the same industry); see also GARY S.
BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE To EDUCATION 29-31 (1964) (arguing that different skills require different
types of training, including generalized schooling and job-specific training).
27. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 1358 (asserting that ILMs arise
because of the costs of job- or company-specific skills).
28. Id. at 1360-61.
29. The employer recovers her investment during the employee's mid-career
years. I&. at 1361. At that stage, the employee's marginal productivity is believed to
exceed the wage paid by the employer. Id. at 1363. At both earlier and later stages
in the employee's career, the employer "invests" in the employee by paying a wage
that is higher than that employee's marginal productivity. Id at 1361. Note, howev-
er, that the incentives for the employer to comply with the implicit contract are sig-
nificantly reduced once the employer has recouped her investment. Id. at 1364.
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voluntarily until after she has recovered all of her invest-
ment.3°
As long as the expectation of a long-term employment
relationship exists, both parties are likely to perform their
obligations under these implicit agreements.3' Employees are
constrained by the need to remain with their employer in or-
der to recoup their investments, while employers are con-
strained by concern for their reputations. Reputation may not
provide sufficient constraint on employers, however. Conse-
quently, depending on their degree of firm-specific investment,
employees may have stronger incentives to remain with the
firm than employers have to keep them. Once employers have
recovered their investments, they have strong incentives to
appropriate the employees' investments by breaching the im-
plicit ILM agreements.32 One way in which employers may
attempt to avoid their obligations is by denying employees
career advancement opportunities, perhaps as a means of
avoiding payment of increased compensation. The employees,
having already made firm-specific investments, may find them-
selves unable to counter this opportunistic behavior by their
employers. Thus, in the absence of outside regulation or its
effective enforcement, opportunities for strategic behavior by
employers may be enhanced.
In recent years, nontraditional workers have gained access
to professions, such as business management, that were previ-
ously closed to them.3' Many other professions are character-
ized by the existence of ILMs. 4 Thus, nontraditional workers
entering these professions are expected to engage in firm-spe-
30. The employee invests early in her career while learning the skills required
to perform a job by agreeing to the employee's opportunity wage, a lower wage than
she could potentially get elsewhere in the market. Id. at 1363. This investment is
recovered at a later point in the employee's career when her actual wage is higher
than her opportunity wage. Id.
31. In this sense, these implicit agreements are believed to be self-enforcing
because each party has a motivation to reveal its otherwise private information. Id.
at 1361. We argu6 that Title VII as currently enforced has distorted the self-enforc-
ing mechanisms of these implicit agreements, leaving nontraditional workers in a
position that is very likely subject to the employer's strategic behavior. Refer to
Parts III & IV infra.
32. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 1364.
33. Robert L Dipboye, Progress and Problems of Women in Management, in
WORKING WOMEN: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 118, 118-19 (Karen S. Koziara et al. eds.,
1987). Scholars in the early 1980s encouraged movement within ILMs as a way of
circumventing problems in ELMs. See, e.g., Patricia Y. Martin et al., Advancement
for Women in Hierarchical Organizations: A Multilevel Analysis of Problems and
Prospects, 19 J. APPLIED BEHAv. Sci. 19, 27 (1983).
34. See Osterman, supra note 3, at 280-89 (tracing the development and role of
ILMs in manufacturing, management, and production careers within organizations).
1995] 1523
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cific investments. For example, in law firms the associates are
expected to cultivate relationships with clients who will remain
with the firm if the individual associate leaves.' Once these
firm-specific investments have been made, ILM employees are,
as explained above,' potentially subject to opportunistic be-
havior by their employers.
B. Is Opportunistic Behavior Blind to Color and Gender?
The applicability of our analysis to discrimination issues
could be questioned on the grounds that the opportunistic be-
havior which may arise in the ILM context may occur regard-
less of race or gender considerations. That is, any employee
who invests in firm-specific skills is a potential target of oppor-
tunistic behavior by the employer.
Our argument is, however, that although opportunistic
behavior can be considered to be color- and gender-blind, its
prevalence is particularly acute for nontraditional workers. Our
rationale for this assertion is twofold. First, by successfully
reducing entry level discrimination, Title VII has caused the
unintended effect of subjecting nontraditional workers who
made firm-specific investments to opportunistic behavior. By
failing to adequately address advancement and promotion deci-
sions in the ILM, Title VII has left these employees unprotect-
ed.
Second, although opportunistic behavior can occur in spite
of race or gender considerations, problems unique to nontradi-
tional workers such as stereotyping, informal access to upper
level positions, and various work environment issues increase
the vulnerability of these employees within the ILM context.37
Gender and racial stereotyping have been manifested in vari-
ous forms. Women and minorities are less likely to obtain
positions in "fast track" line functions and are more likely to
end up in "dead end" staff positions.' Assignment of positions
may involve stereotyping of women and minorities.'
35. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law
Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L REV. 567, 577-78
(1989); see also, Douglas R. Wholey, Determinants of Firm Internal Labor Markets in
Large Law Firms, 30 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 318, 320-22 (1985) (discussing ILMs in law
firms).
36. Refer to note 31 supra and accompanying text.
37. Refer to Part V infra. In fact, analyzing discriminatory practices from the
internal labpr market perspective may provide insights into possible solutions for the
glass ceiling dilemma.
38. See U.S. DFPT oF LABOR, supra note 5, at 16.
39. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (reporting that
[Vol. 31:15171524
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Similarly, performance appraisal systems are often informal,
subjective, and give considerable discretion to the rating offi-
cial.4" Subtle stereotyping can also therefore infect appraisal
systems.4 '
Informal access problems relate to the formal and informal
networks that form within and across business organizations
and that serve as primary sources of information and opportu-
nities. 42 Mid-level and upper level managerial positions tend
to be filled from within the organization, via the ILM. This
type of promotion-from-within system often involves informal
networks and referrals that tend to exclude women and minor-
ities.43 Similarly, women and minorities are often excluded
from developmental programs, training, relocation opportuni-
ties, and key assignments, and they are often without mentors
or sponsors within the organization.' Both stereotyping and
the dearth of women and minorities at the top have been im-
plicated in such results."
Finally, once women and minorities do begin to move into
positions that they have not traditionally held, they may expe-
rience sexual and racial harassment. Such harassment may
prevent women and minorities from succeeding or remaining
within the organization."
Hopkins was criticized for her perceived masculinity and was advised to walk, talk,
and dress more femininely, as well as to wear makeup, style her hair, and wear
jewelry); see also Julie A. Lopez, Study Says Women Face Glass Walls as Well as
Ceilings, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1992, at 1 (noting that long standing types of dis-
crimination against women and minorities are being maintained with those glass
barriers); Radford, supra note 6, at 479, 485 (arguing that organizations block access
to women not conforming to gender norms).
40. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235-37 (noting how a subjective appraisal
system incorporates individual gender bias). Refer to Part 111(B) infra.
41. For example, masculine traits may be strongly correlated with successful
job performance. See ANN HARRIMAN, WOMEN/MEN/MANAGEMENT 221-23 (1985) (re-
porting evidence of an overall male bias in evaluation systems).
42. See Women Lack Access to Communication Lines, Miss Out on Senior Man-
agement Positions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D10 (Mar. 2, 1994) [hereinafter Daily
Lab. Rep.] (reporting that a recent labor law firm survey found that women were
often excluded from informal networks of communication crucial for determining top
management promotions).
43. U.S. DEVT OF LABOR, supra note 5, at 19-20; JOHN P. FERNANDEZ, BLACK
MANAGERS IN WHITE CORPORATIONS 124 (1975); Roos & Reskin, supra note 14, at
245.
44. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 5, at 21-22.
45. Id. at 15, 21-22.
46. See Susan E. Martin, Sexual Harassment: The Link Between Gender Strati-
fication, Sexuality, and Women's Economic Status, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPEC-
TIVE 54, 63 (Jo Freeman ed., 3d ed. 1984) (reporting findings from several surveys
that suggest high job turnover and absenteeism may correlate to the existence of
sexual harassment in the workplace); Frances S. Coles, Forced to Quit: Sexual Ha-
rassment Complaints and Agency Response, 14 SEx ROLES 81, 89 (1986) (noting that
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Thus, stereotyping, informal access, and work environment
issues may play a role in preventing nontraditional workers'
upward mobility within the ILM arrangement. Ideally, these
problems could be remedied by Title VII, but the existing na-
ture of the models of discrimination under Title VII preclude
satisfactory resolution of these and other problems.
III. TITLE VII AND NONTRADITIONAL WORKERS IN ILMs
Title VII bans intentional discrimination on the basis of
gender, race, color, ethnicity, and religion and also bans some
discrimination that is not intentional but which has the effect
of disproportionately burdening one protected group.47 Addi-
tionally, Title VII requires that discrimination alter a term,
condition, or privilege of employment in order to be action-
able.4" Although Title VII has been fairly successful in elimi-
nating discrimination at lower levels within organizations,
similar success has not materialized at higher levels of employ-
some victims resigned or were fired as a result of sexual advances by co-workers);
Anita F. Hill, Sexual Harassment: The Nature of the Beast, 65 S. CAL. L REV. 1445,
1446-47 (1992) (arguing that women who report incidents of harassment are pun-
ished in various, substantial ways and that such punishment reinforces their social
inferiority, thereby relegating them to lower level positions); Ramona L. Paetzold &
Anne M. O'Leary-Kelly, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment in the United States:
Post-Meritor Developments and Implications, 1 GENDER, WORK & ORGANIZATION 50,
50 (1994) (describing problems for women in establishing the more subtle form of
sexual harassment known as "hostile work environment" harassment); Stephanie
Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures, 46 AM. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 497, 497 (1991) (reporting that women quit, transfer, or lose jobs because
of sexual harassment more often than men).
47. Title VII § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) states the following
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
This section, by its very terms, sets out two sorts of prohibited behavior: behavior
that is overtly discriminatory, § 2000e-2(a)(1), and behavior that has a discriminatory
effect, § 2000e-2(aX2). The disparate treatment and disparate impact models are well
known and discussed in employment discrimination law case books. See generally,
BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 13-22, 80-
205 (2d ed. 1983); 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMNATION 47-
301 (2d ed. 1988). For a case description of disparate impact, see, e.g., Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427-30 (1971) (discussing discriminatory testing proce-
dures).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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ment. It may be necessary to reconsider the models of
discrimination if Title VII is to be used to eliminate the more
subtle practices that appear to influence the advancement of
minorities and women.
One cogent explanation for Title VII's lack of ability to
eliminate discrimination at more advanced levels within orga-
nizations is that the disparate treatment and disparate impact
models of discrimination were developed to deal with discrimi-
natory practices in the ELM. Title VII may fail to aid in up-
ward mobility for minorities and women because its models of
discrimination are not effective for handling upward mobility
issues at more advanced levels within the ILM.49 As currently
applied, the models suffer from at least four particular flaws
that have a major impact in ILM employment situations. First,
the existing standards for proof under the models are problem-
atic for ILM employees. Second, the models are not sufficiently
sensitive to stereotyping to eliminate it from ILM employer
decision making. Third, statistical evidence is often required,
but problematic for ILM employees to obtain. Fourth, even
though the new hostile environment model has been created to
help eliminate racial and sexual harassment, it is inadequate
to combat the ILM incentives for the existence of hostile work
environments. In this Part we discuss all of these problem ar-
eas and their particular importance for ILM employees. Al-
though some of these problems have been examined individual-
ly in different contexts,' the aggregate effect of all four
49. Refer to Part III infra. Women and minorities are attempting to use dis-
crimination laws to combat problems with advancement. In fiscal year 1990, nearly
61% of the bias charges filed with the EEOC involved advancement and discharge,
while only about 8% involved hiring. Joann S. Lublin, Rights Law to Spur Shifts in
Promotions, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1991, at B1. Lublin's article predicted that ILMs
would be scrutinized to the same extent as ELMs. Id.
50. Gender stereotyping and problems with women obtaining higher level posi-
tions in organizations have been discussed by many authors. See, e.g., MARY JOE
FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 12-18 (1992) (discussing the gender discrimina-
tion charges brought by the EEOC against Sears in 1973); RHODE, supra note 13, at
169-72 (discussing the unconscious biases and stereotypes that affect opportunities
for women); Radford, supra note 6, at 490 (describing how the masculine character-
ization of effective management styles favors men for higher ranking positions);
Maxine N. Eichner, Note, Getting Women Work That Isn't Women's Work: Challeng-
ing Gender Biases in the Workplace Under Title VII, 97 YALE L.J. 1397, 1398-1404
(1988) (targeting male bias in the description and characterization of employment
positions as the cause of sexual inequalities in the work force). General problems
with obtaining statistical significance in small samples have been discussed. See, e.g.,
RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION:
USING STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES 4-29 to 4-36 (1994) (discuss-
ing the problems of significance and statistical power in small samples). A consid-
erable amount of literature has recently criticized the hostile environment harass-
ment model. See, e.g., Naomi R. Calm, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Rea-
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problems on nontraditional workers in the ILM context has not
previously been considered.
A. Proof Framework and Standards
The standards of proof in Title VII cases pose particular
problems for ILM situations and are problematic within both
the disparate treatment and disparate impact models of Title
VII discrimination.
1. Disparate treatment. The disparate treatment model,
which prohibits intentional discrimination based on race5' or
gender, recognizes that race or gender should not be used as a
proxy or surrogate for other characteristics in which the em-
ployer has legitimate interest. 2 For an individual plaintiff to
establish that a violation of Title VII has occurred under this
model, the plaintiff must show that the employer acted for
discriminatory reasons when making some employment deci-
sion.' Proof of discrimination is obviously easiest when the
sonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398,
1415-17 (1992) (criticizing the reasonable woman standard as stereotypical, unaccom-
modating of all women's experiences, and victim-focused); Ramona L Paetzold &
Anne M. O'Leary-Kelly, Continuing Violations and Hostile Environment Sexual Ha-
rassment: When is Enough, Enough?, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 365, 371-74 (1993) (arguing
that requiring plaintiffs to show severity or pervasiveness of harassment creates
confusion over what standard to use and what evidence is relevant, and also forces
plaintiffs to endure more harassment in order to benefit legally); Paetzold &
O'Leary-Kelly, supra note 46, at 51 (noting how the victim's behavior often draws
the focus away from the harassing party's conduct); Ellen F. Paul, Sexual Harass-
ment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 333,
350-51 (1990) (asserting that sexual harassment claims are inconsistent with Title
VII's goal of addressing gender discrimination in employment because sexual harass-
ment generally targets an individual rather than an entire class); Jolynn Childers,
Note, Is There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A Discussion of Recent
Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 DUKE L.J. 854, 863
(1993) (noting that criticism of the hostile environment model's reasonableness stan-
dard centers around what behavior is unreasonable and whose perspective is deter-
minative).
51. We use the term "race" to include race, color, and ethnicity.
52. The disparate treatment model, for example, does not allow the use of gen-
der as a proxy for longevity when actuarial tables are used to determine pension
contributions or premiums. See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073,
1084 (1983) ('The use of sex-segregated actuarial tables to calculate retirement bene-
fits violates Title VII whether or not the tables reflect an accurate prediction of the
longevity of women as a class . . . ."); City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 711 (1978) (holding an employer's gender-based requirement that female employ-
ees make contributions to a pension fund exceeding those of their male counterparts
violative of Title VII). It seems clear that race would also be an illegitimate proxy
for longevity.
53. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 333, 335
(1977) (detailing the plaintiff's prima facie case).
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employer has made a patently discriminatory remark in
conjunction with the employment decision, or has somehow
explicitly revealed the discriminatory intent present in the
decision.' Not surprisingly, relatively early disparate treat-
ment cases sometimes involved such explicit comments. For
example, in Slack v. Havens,55 a supervisor ordered black
women employees who were not a part of the maintenance or
custodial crew to do general cleanup because "[c]olored peo-
ple ... clean better."' When they refused, they were fired
and were told by their supervisor that "[c]olored people should
stay in their places.' 7 This direct evidence of discriminatory
intent made clear that the termination was an unlawful em-
ployment practice under Title VII.'
Most disparate treatment cases have not involved explicit
expressions of intent, but instead have provided situations
involving an inference of intentional discrimination. Recogniz-
ing the need for inference regarding an employer's intent,
courts fashioned the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine59 framework
as a "sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence' ° in an
individual disparate treatment case. This framework, which
has remained intact for over twenty years, requires that the
plaintiff demonstrate four elements to establish a prima facie
case.61 The plaintiff must show that she is a member of a Ti-
tle VII protected class, that she applied for and was qualified
to perform the available job, that she was denied the job, and
that the employer continued to seek applicants for the posi-
tion.62 Proof of these elements eliminates the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring the plaintiff,' and
54. See, e.g., Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Where
a case of discrimination is proved by direct evidence, the defendant bears a heavier
burden. If the evidence consisted of direct testimony that the defendant acted with a
discriminatory motive, and it is accepted by the trier of fact, the ultimate issue of
discrimination has been proved.") (footnote omitted).
55. 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
56. Id. at 1093.
57. Id. at 1092-93.
58. Id at 1095.
59. The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework comes from two Supreme Court
cases. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (listing the
elements a plaintiff must show); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (elaborating on the McDonnell Douglas standard).
60. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2756 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
61. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
62. Id. These elements are presented in the context of a charge of discrimina-
tion in hiring and must be altered to fit other contexts.
63. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44
(1977) (explaining that "the McDonnell Douglas formula ... does demand that the
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until recently, was determined to imply discrimination unless
the employer could articulate a legitimate, nonpretextual and
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision.'
In the five to four St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks de-
cision, however, the Supreme Court articulated a new rule
making it harder for plaintiffs to win individual disparate
treatment cases. A showing of pretext no longer entitles the
plaintiff to judgment because the plaintiff must still show that
her protected status was the "determining factor" in the
employer's adverse employment decision.' The prima facie
case establishes only a presumption of discrimination that is
rebutted when the employer articulates a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for its actions, whether or not that reason
is true." Thus, an employer who offers a patently false rea-
son for its employment decision can still win the discrimina-
tion case and may be in a better position than the employer
who remains silent and offers no reasons for its conduct.'
The Hicks ruling is particularly problematic for plaintiffs
in ILM situations for three reasons. First, even more than in
ELM situations, the ILM plaintiffs prima facie case may elimi-
nate the best nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer's
actions, thereby providing the inference that the employer's ac-
tions were likely based on impermissible criteria. Employers
have greater uncertainty in ELM hiring situations because
they have less information about applicants and many possible
legitimate reasons exist for not hiring a particular individual
from the ELM. 9 In ILMs, however, employers have more in-
formation about individuals being considered for advance-
ment.7 ° Unless the employer can produce a nondiscriminatory
alleged discriminatee demonstrate at least that his rejection did not result from the
two most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a
job applicant: . . . lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job
sought").
64. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (stating that after the plaintiff
meets the requisite burden of proof, the burden shifts to the employer to show a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff).
65. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
66. Id. at 2748.
67. According to Hicks, "the burden-of-production determination necessarily pre-
cedes the credibility-assessment stage." Id.
68. See id. at 2764 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's opinion as
leading to the perverse result that employers who fail to discover nondiscriminatory
reasons for terminating employees must lie to defend themselves against accusations
of disparate treatment).
69. Employers use the ELM and the ILM to fill different needs in the compa-
ny. See, e.g., Wachter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 1356-57 (finding that firms hire
from the ELM to expand production or to replace lost workers, but promote from
the ILM when "ongoing contractual relationships" are already established).
70. See Peter Cappelli & Wayne F. Cascio, Why Some Jobs Command Wage
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reason that survives pretext analysis, the plaintiff should be
considered to have proven discrimination. Second, it is the
employer-and particularly the ILM employer, who need rely
only on internal work force data for its promotion deci-
sions-who is in the better position to uncover the reason for
its employment decision. As Justice Souter noted in dissent,
the Hicks rule will tend to disfavor plaintiffs who lack direct
evidence of discriminatory intent."1 Third, the ILM employer
has compelling economic incentives to behave opportunistically
toward employees seeking advancement and thus may have
greater incentives to lie.' If a plaintiff must prove the
employer's articulated reasons are false and must also uncover
and disprove other possible nondiscriminatory reasons why the
employer acted in a certain way to create a sufficient inference
of intent, the ILM employee will not be able recoup her invest-
ment. Instead, the employer's strategic behavior will be re-
warded.
2. Disparate impact. The disparate impact model permits
challenges to "neutral" employment criteria 3 and does not
require any inference of intent to find a discriminatory practice
illegal.74 This model was first articulated in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.7' as a means of eliminating employment practices
that systematically disadvantage blacks, but has since been
extended to other groups.' The model has been responsible
for the elimination of many selection mechanisms, such as
Premiums: A Test of Career Tournament and Internal Labor Market Hypotheses, 34
ACAD. MGMT. J. 848, 853 (1991) (finding that internal promotion methods such as
career ladders assist employers in monitoring employee behavior and in selecting
appropriate employees for promotion).
71. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's
opinion for saddling a victim of discrimination with the burden of having to disprove
all possible nondiscriminatory reasons suggested in the record).
72. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 1358 (stating that ILMs reduce
costs associated with the ELM). But see id. (noting that the costs of training and
monitoring ILMs are high).
73. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989)
(stating that evidence of an employer's intent to discriminate is not necessary to find
that a facially neutral employment practice violates Title VII); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (stating that a plaintiff has only to show that the facially
neutral standards result in a discriminatory hiring pattern to make a prima facie
case); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (stating that Title VII
does not allow retention of facially neutral practices if they effectively freeze the
status quo of prior discrimination).
74. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (prohibiting facially neutral intelligence tests
because they maintained the status quo of prior discriminatory practices).
75. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
76. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330-31 (applying the disparate impact model
articulated in Griggs to gender-based discriminatory hiring criteria).
1995] 1531
HeinOnline  -- 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1531 1994-1995
1532 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:1517
education, height, and weight, that may tend to disadvantage
a particular race or sex under Title VII.
77
The disparate impact model requires the plaintiff to chal-
lenge a specific employment practice as having an adverse
impact on one of Title VII's protected groups. 8 This adverse
impact is typically shown through some quantitative demon-
stration of the disadvantage on a particular subgroup within
the protected category.79 If this showing reflects sufficient dis-
advantage to the subgroup, the burden then shifts to the em-
ployer to prove that the challenged practice was justified by
"business necessity."'" If the employer can show the practice
was necessary for the employment decision in question, the
burden then shifts back to the plaintiff, who will lose unless
she can demonstrate that other criteria or selection methods
would simultaneously achieve the employer's purposes and
have lesser adverse impact on the protected group.8'
77. Griggs argued that requiring a high school degree and a passing score on a
standardized general intelligence test caused a disparate impact on blacks. Griggs,
401 U.S. at 425-26. Dothard challenged height and weight requirements applied to
women seeking correctional counselor positions. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 323-24.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(kX1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1994). Note that there is an excep-
tion for plaintiffs who can demonstrate that the elements of an employer's decision
making process are "not capable of separation for analysis." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(kX1XBXi) (Supp. V 1994). These plaintiffs may treat the entire decision making
process as one employment practice. Id
79. For example, in a challenge of height and weight requirements for police
officers, the showing would involve a comparison between the proportion of women
and proportion of men who meet these requirements and who are otherwise qualified
to become police officers. In general, plaintiffs must make some form of statistical
showing to indicate the existence of the appropriate disparities. See, e.g., Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (stating that substantial statis-
tical disparities are needed to raise an inference of causation, and that the specific
practices causing the statistical disparities must be identified). Courts vary as to
how stringent that showing must be. Some courts rely more heavily on the four-
fifths rule, which has been articulated by the EEOC to mean that "[a] selection rate
for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths . . . of the rate for
the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforce-
ment agencies as evidence of adverse impact . . . ." 29 C.F.R. §1607.4(D) (1993).
Other courts require a showing of statistical significance, using accepted hypothesis
testing procedures. For a discussion of the necessary quantitative showing, see, e.g.,
Waisome v. Port Auth., 948 F.2d 1370, 1375-78 (2d Cir. 1991) (conducting a statisti-
cal analysis of black and white candidates promoted to the rank of sergeant).
80. The Court in Wards Cove placed the entire burden of persuasion on the
plaintiff. Wards Cove, 409 U.S. at 659-60. However, this particular burden was rein-
stated to a burden of persuasion for the defendant under the Civil Rights Act of
1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i).
81. Title VII requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the efficacy of an alternative
employment practice "in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1994). This reinstates the required showing to
what it would have been at the time of the Wards Cove case. Because the Court in
Wards Cove arguably reached its interpretation of that issue by using all of the
precedents existing on June 4, 1989, it would appear that this showing is the same
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The disparate impact model standards are problematic for
ILM plaintiffs in at least two ways. First, neutral selection
criteria may be difficult to specify, or may be so informal that
they are difficult to associate with the employer per se. For
example, consider an employer that expressly or impliedly
encourages, but does not solicit or require, in-house refer-
rals. 2 Does this constitute a selection mechanism instituted
by the employer?'s Alternatively, suppose that within an orga-
nization there are highly informal channels that provide access
to information regarding promotions, selection for executive
training, selection for foreign assignments, or other opportuni-
ties generally correlated with career advancement. Although
theoretically available to all employees, certain groups of em-
ployees may have greater access than others. The disparate
impact model does not appear to allow challenges to these
criteria because they are not the employer's selection mecha-
nisms. Instead, they are informal information networks.' The
mere existence of such networks-often to the exclusion of
more formalized networks providing similar information-could
be viewed as an endorsement by the employer, but courts may
not ascribe these informal channels to the employer.' To the
extent that such informal networks become even more impor-
tant in ILMs than in ELMs (because firm-specific investment
may provide incentives for the existence of such "grooming"
networks), the disparate impact model does not satisfactorily
meet the needs of ILM employees.'
as that expected in Wards Cove and other cases. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656
(articulating the showing required of the plaintiff). For an explication of that show-
ing, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); see also C. Ray
Gullett, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Did It Really Overturn Wards Cove?, 43 LAB.
L.J. 462, 465 (1992) (stating that Title VII has not reversed Wards Cove and con-
cluding that the plaintiffs burden of proof "appears no less difficult than before").
82. For instance, in EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292
(7th Cir. 1991), the employer acted upon word-of-mouth referrals that were "under-
taken solely by employees." 947 F.2d at 305.
83. In Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, the court of appeals stated that the
lower court had 'erred in considering passive reliance on employee word-of-mouth re-
cruiting as a particular employment practice for the purposes of disparate impact.*
Id.
84. See id. (holding that no disparate impact liability exists against an em-
ployer who passively waits for applicants who learn of opportunities from current
employees).
85. Refer to note 82 supra and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 997-98 (5th Cir.
1984) (holding the airline not liable for disparate impact in removing pregnant flight
attendants because removal was justified by business necessity); Zahorik v. Cornell
Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 96 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the university's tenure selection
criteria, which excluded four female professors, did not violate Title VII because the
criteria were justified as job-related).
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Second, the definition of business necessity has become
somewhat loose and broad, thereby allowing greater deference
to the employer. Far from meaning a practice that is necessary
to the operation of the business, as the plain language sug-
gests, business necessity has often been interpreted as any
legitimate business reason, 7 bringing the standard much clos-
er to the employer's burden of production in a disparate treat-
ment case. This loosened burden on the employer provides con-
siderable deference to employer decision making, particularly
regarding internal promotions. Courts may view promotions to
fairly high level business positions as "marriages" within the
organization, requiring a close fit in outlook, personality, and
other subjective factors.' For example, in Johnson v. Uncle
Ben's, Inc.,9 while commenting in dicta that Uncle Ben's pro-
duced evidence that blacks and Mexican-Americans were not
promoted because of "plausible, legitimate employment goals,"
the court indicated that it would "not decide how Uncle Ben
should determine which applicants have the required
qualifications for particular jobs and which applicants do
not."' The reluctance of courts to substitute their own judg-
ments for those of the business organization in cases involving
internal promotion and advancement decisions has the effect of
reducing the protection provided by Title VII to those workers
in ILM situations.
B. Stereotyping
Title VII's failure to assist women and minorities ade-
quately in advancement and promotion is due in part persis-
tent stereotypes. Subtle stereotypes may infiltrate the
87. See Aguilera v. Cook County Police & Corrections Merit Bd., 760 F.2d 844,
847 (7th Cir.) (interpreting business necessity as "'efficient,' which is pretty much
the same thing as 'reasonable' "), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 907 (1985); Pouncy v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that after a plain-
tiff meets its burden, the employer has the burden of proving the hiring procedure
is "justified by a legitimate business reason"); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., No. 74-
H-435, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19733, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 1991) (upholding the
defendant's practices as serving plausible, legitimate goals), affd, 965 F.2d 1363 (5th
Cir. 1992).
88. See, e.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224, 370-71 (N.D.
Tex. 1980) (describing the hiring of upper level employees as requiring consideration
of subjective, immeasurable traits such as loyalty, ability, and reliability), vacated on
other grounds, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984); see also
Bartholet, supra note 10, at 973 (noting the role of subjective assessment in upper
level jobs).
89. No. 74-H-435, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19733.
90. Id. at "6-*7.
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employer's decision making process. Courts may then fail to
identify these stereotypes and, as a result, reinforce the
employer's stereotypical thinking.91 Stereotyping is problemat-
ic for both the disparate treatment and disparate impact mod-
els.92
1. Disparate treatment. The disparate treatment model
sends conflicting signals regarding an employer's use of stereo-
types in decision making. On the one hand, in cases such as
City of Los Angeles v. Manhart,93 the Supreme Court indicat-
ed that even true statistical categorizations can result in
harmful, stereotyped decision making when applied to individ-
uals.' On the other hand, Title VII itself permits the stereo-
typing of certain individuals.
The sanctioning of gender-based stereotypes under Title
VII is most vividly illustrated by the notion of the "bona fide
occupational qualification" (BFOQ) defense to disparate treat-
ment. Under the BFOQ defense, employers may explicitly use
gender differences as the basis for various employment deci-
sions.95 This defense may allow an employer in limited situa-
tions to hire only men for particular jobs.' In United Auto
Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.97  the Supreme Court
91. See, e.g., Nadine Taub, Keeping Women In Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se
as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L REV. 345, 348 n.16 (1980) (not-
ing courts that have accepted stereotypical pay inequality as not violative of Title
VII).
92. Stereotyping is also problematic for the hostile environment model of sexual
harassment, but we treat that model separately. Refer to Part III(D) and note 177
infra and accompanying text.
Stereotypes can range in nature from those that are "real" or "substantially
true" (i.e., elaborately reasoned and statistically indicated distinctions between men
and women, and among blacks, Hispanics, and other racial groups), to those beliefs
that cannot be empirically substantiated (i.e., unanalyzed and unsubstantiated per-
sonally held views). See Taub, supra note 91, at 349-61 (detailing numerous catego-
ries and methods of stereotyping); Ramona L Paetzold et al., The Empirical Person:
The Problematic Role of Statistics and Difference in Diversity Research in Social
Science 8-12 (Nov. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Houston Law
Review) (listing forms of stereotyping and arguing for a new methodology focusing on
individual experiences).
93. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
94. Id. at 707-08 (noting that all members of a class do not always share the
stereotypical characteristics).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
96. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 337-38 (1977) (holding a
policy to hire only male counselors at an all-male prison within the BFOQ excep-
tion); Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1532 (7th
Cir. 1988) (stating that a policy to hire only women for a female rehabilitation pro-
gram should be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances and the need
for an innovative approach), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017 (1989).
97. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
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reiterated that the BFOQ defense is acceptable only in excep-
tional cases.' The Johnson Controls holding on the scope of
the BFOQ defense was not unanimous. Four justices believed
the cost to the employer could control in some cases, thus al-
lowing the BFOQ to apply to a broader spectrum of cases.'
In any event, the BFOQ defense permits some use of social
stereotyping to exclude women from jobs. It promotes the idea
that there are essential differences between men and women
that employers may take into account in the employment rela-
tionship.
These essential differences tend to be socially con-
structed."° Further, employers do not need empirical evi-
dence to support their claim that these essential differences
exist. Although proof of a BFOQ requires that the employer
have reasonable cause to believe that "all or substantially all"
women cannot perform the job, 01 employers may rely on a
common sense understanding of the nature of the job environ-
ment and men's and women's relationship to that environ-
ment.0 2  This judicial deference allows employers to use
stereotypes in employment decision making and renders Title
VII less potent in eradicating social stereotypes that hinder
women's advancement. The mere presence of the BFOQ de-
fense, coupled with the common sense standard of proof for
part of it, weakens the disparate treatment model of discrimi-
nation.
Similarly, despite Manhar's sweeping language regarding
the dangers of employer stereotyping, more subtle, judgmental
forms of stereotyping have not been as readily recognized by
the courts. Perhaps the best example is the well-known case of
98. The Court in this case held that women at Johnson Controls could be ex-
cluded from a position solely based on gender only if their gender or pregnant condi-
tion would actually interfere with their ability to perform the job. Id. at 206.
99. Id. at 217 (White, J., concurring).
100. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336-37 (holding that women can be excluded
from the position of security guard in an all-male maximum security prison because
they are likely to be victimized by men, further placing the safety of all guards at
risk).
101. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985). The complete
BFOQ test has two parts, requiring (1) that the particular protected class status be
.reasonably necessary to the essence of [the] business," and (2) that all or substan-
tially all persons outside the protected class status be unable to perform the job, or
that it would be impossible to deal with persons outside the protected class status
on an individual basis. Id. at 413-14.
102. Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1532-
33 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that, given the special nature of employment consider-
ations in an all female prison, requiring the employer to adopt a completely objec-
tive hiring policy constituted reversible error), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017 (1989).
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Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins."° Price Waterhouse denied Ann
Hopkins a partnership because she was considered to be "ma-
cho"; she "overcompensated for being a woman," "us[ed] foul
language," and needed to take "a course at charm school."0"
She had also generated more business than any other associate
considered for partnership that year.'0 5 Instead of offering
her the partnership, Price Waterhouse advised her to "walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.""° Al-
though Hopkins ultimately won the case, the Supreme Court's
endorsement of this case as a "mixed motive" disparate treat-
ment case supports gender-based stereotyping in the
workplace.
The Court recognized that blatant stereotypical comments
about Hopkins had been mixed with other legitimate, suppos-
edly nonstereotypical, comments regarding Hopkins' personality
and ability to get along with others.107 The Court did not rec-
ognize that these concerns may have been salient only because
she was a woman. Both the fact and manner of Price
Waterhouse's concern with Hopkins' personality suggest the
presence of gender tainting. In addition, a strong opinion dis-
senting from the plurality argued that employers could not be
held liable for their failure to "make partners sensitive to the
dangers [of stereotyping], to discourage comments tainted by
sexism, or to investigate comments to determine whether they
were influenced by stereotypes.""8 Despite credible expert
testimony to the contrary, the dissent appeared to view de-
scriptions such as "overbearing and abrasive" as gender neu-
tral.1°9
Stereotyping can also be a problem in disparate treatment
situations because of the use of subjective standards for promo-
tion and advancement decisions. Decisions about who is quali-
fied under such criteria can become particularly problematic.
For example, in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co."' it was al-
leged that Sears had disproportionately failed to hire and
103. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
104. I& at 235.
105. Id. at 234.
106. Id. at 235.
107. Id. at 236-37 (acknowledging the district court's finding that the employer
legitimately considered the plaintiffs interpersonal skills in its promotion procedure,
but holding that the employer nevertheless violated Title VII by giving weight to
other employees' gender-based comments about the plaintiff).
108. Id. at 294 (quoting the district court's opinion) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 293 n.5 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
110. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
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promote women into commission sales positions.' Sears jus-
tified the low number of women in these positions by describ-
ing both the positions and the characteristics of individuals
who would be able to fill them satisfactorily-characterizations
that strongly suggest Sears viewed these positions inherently
as "men's" positions. Sears noted that commission sales work
tended to be risky in providing compensation, tended to re-
quire more independence than other sales work, and some-
times required technical knowledge."2 Additionally, Sears ar-
gued that to be a good commission sales worker, an individual
must be aggressive, highly motivated, knowledgeable, and a
especial breed of cat.""' Expert testimony was unable to help
the court recognize the masculine descriptions of the personali-
ty traits governing Sears' selection process."'
2. Disparate impact. The disparate impact model was de-
veloped for use with so-called objective selection criteria, such
as educational,"' height, and weight requirements."' Al-
though the Supreme Court recently indicated that disparate
impact theory also applies to subjective employer decision mak-
ing criteria,"' courts may be loath to displace employer judg-
ments about such criteria, believing that the organization has
superior expertise to establish the standards by which candi-
dates for promotion should be judged."8 Thus, for example, a
nebulous criterion such as "possessing leadership qualities"
could be difficult to challenge under disparate impact theo-
ry-"9 Even though the criterion allows for the possibility of
considerable stereotyping in its interpretation and instrumenta-
tion, courts may defer to organizations' needs to identify pro-
spective leaders, particularly under the looser interpretation of
business necessity."2  Consequently, the resulting stereo-
111. Id. at 1278.
112. Id. at 1289-90.
113. Id. at 1290.
114. FRUG, supra note 50, at 14-15.
115. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (applying the
disparate impact model to a facially neutral diploma requirement).
116. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
117. Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
118. See id. at 999 (noting that "[c]ourts are generally less competent than em-
ployers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress
they should not attempt it" (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
578 (1978)) (alteration in original).
119. See id. (noting that certain qualities attach to managerial responsibilities
that are not amenable to objective criteria, thus making the plaintiffs case inherent-
ly difficult to prove under disparate impact theory).
120. See.id. at 997 (noting that business necessity provides the defendant with a
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typical beliefs held by many employers about leadership quali-
ties may exclude women from higher level managerial posi-
tions.'
The inability of Title VII to eradicate stereotyping from
the workplace carries a bigger toll on ILM workers because the
economics of the ILM render them vulnerable to opportunistic
behavior by the employer."2 Sanctioned stereotyping provides
the employer with yet another mechanism for carrying out its
opportunistic desire to eliminate ILM workers who are trying
to recoup their initial investments by advancing in the organi-
zation.' 3 Because race- and gender-based stereotyping are
particularly prevalent in our society, ILM employers may en-
gage in these opportunistic behaviors at a great cost to nontra-
ditional workers.
C. Statistical Proof of Discrimination
The disparate impact model and disparate treatment mod-
el, via systemic disparate treatment,"24  both rely on
defense against a claim of discrimination upon a showing of disparate impact by the
plaintiff).
121. See, e.g., Joan Acker, Gendering Organizational Theory, in GENDERING OR-
GANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 248, 255 (Albert J. Mills & Peta Tancred eds., 1992) (noting
that women are perceived to be unable to adhere to organizational rules because of
their obligations to family and reproduction); Marta B. Calds & Linda Smircich, Us-
ing the F Worck Feminist Theories and the Social Consequences of Organizational Re-
search, 49 ACAD. MGMT. BEST PAPERS PROC. 355, 355 (1989) (noting that women
must fit into preestablished organizational structures); Marta B. Calds & Linda
Smircich, Voicing Seduction to Silence Leadership, 12 ORGANIZATION STUD. 567, 568,
571-72 (1991) (noting that leadership is stereotyped as a "seductive game," tradition-
ally defined using masculine characteristics); Alice H. Eagly et al., Gender and the
Evaluation of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 18 (1992) (concluding
that women tend to be devalued in leadership or management capacities when those
duties are carried out in stereotypical masculine fashion).
Similarly, minorities also face assignment difficulties because of stereotypes.
See Jeffrey H. Greenhaus et al., Effects of Race on Organizational Experiences, Job
Performance Evaluations, and Career Outcomes, 33 AcAD. MGMT. J. 64, 65-66 (1990)
(discussing the factors that give rise to racial stereotypes in the workplace and their
impact on the promotability of African-Americans). Minorities may stereotypically be
viewed as lazy or slow, uninterested in career development, unsuitable for foreign
assignments, and lacking in leadership styles or abilities. See id. at 67-69 (noting
that these perceptions are perpetuated by minorities' inability to receive work en-
hancing opportunities and to form supportive relationships within an organization).
African-Americans are often given lower job performance evaluations than whites,
particularly when whites are doing the ratings. Id. at 66. Minorities are overlooked
for experiential or educational opportunities that would help them have greater ac-
cess to high level positions within the organization. Id. at 80.
122. Refer to notes 31-36 supra and accompanying text.
123. Id.
124. See PAETZOLD & WiLLBORN, supra note 50, at 1-17 to 1-20 (describing the
systemic, or class wide, disparate treatment model). A claimant seeking relief under
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statistical evidence as proof of discrimination."2 In systemic
disparate treatment discrimination, a pattern or practice of
discrimination is typically established by statistical
evidence," giving rise to an inference of intent."2 In dispa-
rate impact discrimination, the plaintiffs initial burden to
demonstrate an adverse impact on her protected class is typi-
cally shown through quantitative evidence.1" The need for
statistical evidence to establish these two types of cases can
pose problems in ILM settings.
First, the population of people affected by employer poli-
cies in ILMs may be relatively small."2 This is particularly
true as employees move up through the ILM into high level
positions. Even though there may be a relatively large number
of employees at entry level positions, there will be a relatively
small pool of potential candidates at mid-level and high level
positions to promote into senior management.
To show an intentional practice that excludes Hispanics,
for example, the Hispanic plaintiff might compare the percent-
age of Hispanics promoted with the percentage of Hispanics
available for promotion. 3 The percentages will be based on
a systemic disparate treatment model will try to establish a policy of intentional dis-
crimination. Id. at 1-17. By comparison, in the individual claimant disparate
treatment model, the aggrieved claimant will try to show that he was disadvantaged
because of his group status. Id. at 1-5. This cause of action requires a stronger
showing of direct injury to the claimant. Id. at 1-5 to 1-7.
The principles of the systemic disparate treatment model have been used in
case law to find discrimination under Title VII. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478
U.. 385, 387 (1986) (holding that the lower courts erred in disregarding petitioners'
statistical analysis of pre-Title VII wage discrimination against black workers); City
of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717 (1978) (holding defendant's policy re-
quiring female employees to contribute more to a pension fund than male employees
discriminatory under Title VII).
125. See generally PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 50, at 1-17 to 1-22, &
cbs. 4, 5 (describing the systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact models
of discrimination).
126. See id. at 1-17 to 1-20 (describing a prima facie case of systemic disparate
treatment). The claimant's prima facie case is established in part by statistical evi-
dence showing differential treatment of the protected class. Id. at 29.
127. See id. at 2-11 to 2-16 (noting that while statistics cannot conclusively
prove discrimination, they can give rise to a rebuttable inference of discrimination).
128. See id. at 1-21 to 1-22 (identifying evidentiary requirements in disparate
impact analysis).
129. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 1357 (noting that compared to
ELMs, ILMs involve relatively few participants).
130. See, e.g., PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 50, at 4-23 to 4-24 (discussing
the use of selection rates in disparate treatment analysis); Ramona L. Paetzold,
Problems with Statistical Significance in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 26
NEW ENG. L. REV. 395, 397-99 (1991) (providing a hypothetical involving a qualified
female job applicant trying to prove intentional discrimination by comparing the
number of women in the relevant labor force with the number of women hired by
the allegedly discriminatory employer).
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small absolute numbers of Hispanics; thus, a statistical com-
parison will likely reflect no statistical difference between the
two percentages. 31 Similarly, if a Hispanic plaintiff wants to
show that a particular selection criterion, such as a test,
disproportionately affects Hispanics, the pass rate for Hispan-
ics would be compared with the pass rate for others. 32 Small
numbers of individuals taking the test, coupled with even
smaller numbers of Hispanics taking the test, could make it
difficult to find any'statistically significant differences in the
two pass rates. In short, comparisons based on small numbers
of individuals make it difficult to find the statistical signifi-
cance typically required for establishment of a plaintiffs prima
facie case."
Second, even though it is difficult to obtain statistically
significant differences for small sample sizes, these differences
do occasionally occur. When they do, courts may discount them
because they are based on a small sample." For example, in
131. See PAETzoLD & WILLBORN, supra note 50, at 4-36 (noting that small sam-
ples have low statistical power to detect such differences).
132. See id. at 5-8 to 5-12 (discussing comparison of pass or selection rates in
disparate impact analysis).
133. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 (1977)
(noting that a mere 2% disparity between the percentage of black teachers hired in
a given region and the percentage of qualified black teachers present in the region
may weaken proof of discrimination on remand); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.
Supp. 1054, 1064 (D.D.C. 1992) (noting that the plaintiff, as her organization's only
black female, failed to show sufficiently meaningful statistics to find discrimination
in the defendant's promotion practices under a disparate impact theory). Courts have
increasingly required sophisticated tests to demonstrate systemic disparate treatment
and impact. See, e.g., Palmer v. Schultz, 815 F.2d 84, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding
that the plaintiffs showing of underselection of women measuring 3.1 standard devi-
ations, without any showing of explanation by the defendant for the discrepancy,
was sufficient as a matter of law to sustain a finding of disparate treatment); Ar-
nold v. Postmaster Gen., 667 F. Supp. 6, 22-23 (D.D.C. 1987) (using statistical
methods of correlation and chi-square analysis to find a disparate impact based on
age discrimination), rev'd on other grounds, 863 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 846 (1989). For small sample sizes, there may be inadequate infor-
mation to statistically detect differences or disparities. See, e.g., Hatcher-Capers, 786
F. Supp. at 1064 (noting that decreasing sample sizes increase the possibility that
noted discrepancies in treatment are due to chance rather than discrimination); JA-
COB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 7 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing the mathematics of sample reliability and noting that some kinds
of statistical precision increase with increasing sample sizes); Jacob Cohen, A Power
Primer, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 155, 155-56 (1992) (discussing the merits of using sta-
tistical power analysis in the behavioral sciences and its applicability in determining
the proper sample sizes needed to obtain statistically significant results); Richard
Goldstein, Two Types of Statistical Errors in Employment Discrimination Cases, 26
JURIMETnICS J. 32, 38-39 (1985) (noting that one solution to inherent statistical
weaknesses in small samples in discrimination cases is to increase the sample by
aggregating affected groups).
134. See, e.g., Waisome v. Port Auth., 948 F.2d 1370, 1379 (2d Cir. 1991)
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Waisome v. Port Authority,1" the Second Circuit held that a
statistically significant disparity in pass rates between black
and white police officers taking a written exam for promotion
to sergeant was of limited use because of small sample
size." The court noted that if only two additional black can-
didates had passed the written examination, the disparity
would no longer have been statistically significant.137 Use of
hypothetical alterations to demonstrate that small shifts in the
numbers can alter statistical significance has become increas-
ingly common." Unfortunately, this reasoning ignores the
fact that the statistical procedure adjusts for sample size, and
that given the difficulty of obtaining significant results in
small samples, the presence of such results should be taken
seriously. Courts that discount such evidence unfairly penalize
plaintiffs for being part of a small group.
(noting that statistics based on small samples are not reliable indicators of disparate
impact); Frazier v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 851 F.2d 1447, 1451-52 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(noting that small sample sizes undermined the plaintiff's disparate impact analysis);
Washington v. Electrical Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm'n, 845 F.2d 710,
713 (7th Cir.) (holding that it was not reversible error for the district court to refuse
to infer discrimination against a black committee applicant when only 20 positions
were available), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 944 (1988); Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d
1373, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982) (denying the female plaintiff's claim of gender discrimi-
nation in the selection of grand jury forepersons based on a sample of only 10 grand
juries over a 3 1/2 year span), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983); Eubanks v.
Pickens-Bond Constr. Co., 635 F.2d 1341, 1350 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting that the pro-
motion of only 4 cement finishers to foremen constitutes a sample too small for a
meaningful statistical analysis to sustain the black plaintiff's claim of dis-
crimination); Murray v. District of Columbia, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 644,
646 (D.D.C. 1983) (finding that the selection of 4 whites and 7 blacks for interviews
from applicant pools of 74 whites and 36 blacks did not discriminate against a white
applicant because the sample size of 11 positions was less than adequate to make a
relevant statistical determination); cf Hartman v. Wick, 600 F. Supp. 361, 371
(D.D.C. 1984) (noting that statistics based on small sample sizes are discouraged,
but suggesting that even small samples can give rise to a finding of discrimination
if disparities are "egregious").
135. 948 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1991).
136. Id. at 1375-77 (noting the examination pass rate of black applicants was
87.2/o of white applicants and that passage by just two more blacks would have
negated the disparity's statistical importance).
137. Id. at 1376.
138. See, e.g., Guinyard v. City of New York, 800 F. Supp. 1083, 1089 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (describing the use of the "80/o Plus 1 Rule," whereby if one extra minority is
hypothetically assumed to have achieved the desired status, resulting in a minority
pass rate greater than 80% of the nonminority pass rate, then no inference of dis-
crimination is shown); Murray, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 646 (noting that
if one extra white applicant had been chosen for one of eleven interview positions,
no statistically relevant discrepancy against whites would be found); cf. 29 C.F.R. §
1607.4 (1988) (discussing the appropriateness of offering evidence concerning the use
and results of a particular selection procedure in circumstances similar to those in
which a discriminatory practice is suspected but which involves an unreliably small
sample size).
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Thus, in ILMs there will be a point at which nontradition-
al employees will find it difficult to avail themselves of the
systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact models.
The models are ill-suited to small populations because statis-
tical significance is relatively difficult to obtain in such situa-
tions. Even when it does occur, courts may discount its impor-
tance.
D. The ILM Work Environment
Hostile environment harassment is a relatively new form
of discrimination actionable under Title VII," and it is one
that almost exclusively targets nontraditional workers. Al-
though most often associated with sexual harassment, there
are recent reported cases involving racial- or ethnicity-based
harassment.4 Hostile environments may occur in any type of
organization, but they are primarily associated with employ-
ment situations in which women and minorities appear in rela-
tively small numbers and are viewed as nontraditional work-
ers.' Additionally, harassment may occur at all levels
139. See Paetzold & O'Leary-Kelly, supra note 50, at 367 (noting that the feder-
al circuit courts began recognizing hostile work environment as sexual discrimination
in the early 1980s); see, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901, 903-05
(11th Cir. 1982) (holding that sexually hostile or offensive work environments pres-
ent actionable discrimination under Title VII, and setting forth the elements for the
claimant's cause of action); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(determining that Title VII covers sexual discrimination predicated on a substantially
discriminatory work environment). The United States Supreme Court first recognized
this claim in 1986. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (holding
that a claimant may establish a violation of Title VII by proving discrimination
based on a sexually hostile or abusive working environment). Commentators have
argued that the claim should be considered sui generis under Title VII. See Paetzold
& O'Leary-Kelly, supra note 50, at 366-67, 377-78 (advancing several reasons for this
conclusion, most relating to problems posed by the statute of limitations to hostile
work environment claims under Title VII).
140. See, e.g., Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 983 F.2d 1573, 1576-78
(11th Cir. 1993) (denying the plaintiff's claim of posthiring racial harassment under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 because the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended this section
to cover the plaintiffs alleged situation, could not be retroactively applied); Busby v.
City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that a Title VII action
for racial harassment was appropriate but should not have been brought against the
plaintiffs employers in their individual capacities); Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d
1094, 1102-03 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming the lower court's ruling of racial discrimina-
tion based on a racially hostile work environment under Title VII).
141. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation
of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1204 (1989) (noting that "[wiomen are
comparative newcomers to many kinds of work"). See generally Edward Lafontaine &
Leslie Tredeau, The Frequency, Sources, and Correlates of Sexual Harassment Among
Women in Traditional Male Occupations, 15 SEx ROLES 433, 441-42 (1986) (conclud-
ing that sexual harassment erects a formidable barrier to equal treatment for fe-
males in traditionally male-dominated work fields).
HeinOnline  -- 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1543 1994-1995
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
within an organization, so that women and minorities in man-
agerial level positions may become targets of harassment by
superiors and subordinates alike.142
The legal model for a hostile work environment requires
the plaintiff to prove that she was subjected to unwelcome
harassment that occurred because of her protected class status,
and that such harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employ-
ment.' Unlike other forms of discrimination under Title VII,
the employer is generally not automatically liable for a hostile
work environment. Agency theory principles govern employer
liability.'" Thus, although the employer may be strictly liable
for a hostile environment created by a supervisor,'45 it would
not be strictly liable for a hostile environment created by a
victim's co-worker. In the latter case, the employer may be
liable if it knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to take prompt remedial action. 4
6
Many commentators have noted problems in the imple-
mentation of this legal framework and the difficulties that it
poses for harassment victims.'47 The lack of automatic liabili-
ty imposes an additional burden on women and minorities,
who are harassed more often than white males.'48 The recent
Supreme Court endorsement of the reasonable person standard
for determining the effect of the alleged harassment on the
victim may make it difficult for women and minorities to
142. See, e.g., Kathleen McKinney, Sexual Harassment of University Faculty by
Colleagues and Students, 23 SEx ROLES 421, 431-32 (1990) (describing sexual harass-
ment of university professors by students as "contrapower harassment").
143. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993).
144. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (suggesting that
the use of agency theory in Title VII cases to fix employer liability may be appro-
priate in light of the fact that the Title's definition of "employer" includes any
"agent" of the employer). The courts of appeal have further developed relevant agen-
cy principles. Refer to notes 145-46 infra and accompanying text.
145. E.g., Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th
Cir. 1988); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559-60 (11th Cir.
1987) (holding that because a discriminating supervisor has the apparent authority
to alter the plaintiffs employment status, respondeat superior applies and establishes
employer liability directly, even absent a showing of actual notice of the discrimina-
tory conduct by the supervisor).
146. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990). Em-
ployers may, however, absolve themselves of liability by taking steps that are pro-
portional to the seriousness of the harassment and that are reasonably calculated to
end the harassment in the workplace. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881-82 (9th
Cir. 1991).
147. Refer to note 50 supra and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Riger, supra note 46, at 497 (noting a 1981 survey concluding
that 40% of the women polled reported having experienced sexual harassment, com-
pared to 15% of the men polled in the same survey).
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convince fact finders of their discomfort in the workplace.149
Although courts have been relatively sympathetic to minority
plaintiffs who complain of racially offensive language, women
have not always fared as well."W Courts have more difficulty
determining the scope of language that gives rise to actionable
sexual harassment. Gendered or "sexist" comments are more
difficult to see as sexual harassment than are explicitly "sexu-
al" comments. 5' Further, courts may more often recognize
hostile environment harassment when victims behave in ste-
reotypical ways'52 than when victims appear to be stronger
and suffer fewer psychological or physical symptoms."
149. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (noting that a
reasonable person standard should be used to judge whether a work environment is
sufficiently abusive to warrant protection under Title VII). Many commentators have
debated the appropriateness of a 'reasonable victim" standard, particularly in the
context of gender discrimination. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 50, at 1402-03
(criticizing the application of a "reasonable woman" standard to sexual harassment
cases because this classification operates to disempower women and furthers female
stereotypes); Childers, supra note 50, at 856-57 (arguing that a reasonable woman
standard, while producing the short term benefits of heightened sensitivity to
women's issues in the workplace, ultimately works against the goal of defining a
standard of conduct mutually acceptable to both sexes); Ramona L. Paetzold & Bill
Shaw, A Postmodern Feminist View of 'Reasonableness" in Hostile Environment Sexu-
al Harassment, 13 J. Bus. ETHIcs 681, 681 (1994) (noting how the reasonableness
standard is often used to enforce social norms of conformity and to preserve male
privilege); cf. Elizabeth A. Glidden, The Emergence of the Reasonable Woman in
Combating Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 77 IowA L. REv. 1825, 1829
(1992) (asserting that the use of a reasonable woman standard is proper for deter-
mining workplace hostility in Title VII actions).
150. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986)
(concluding that the plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proving sexual harass-
ment), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). Results for women alleging sex-based ha-
rassment vary considerably. In Rabidue, female employees were subjected to posters
that portrayed women in states of undress and comments by one supervisor describ-
ing women as "whores," "cunt," and "pussy." Id. at 623-24 (Keith, J., dissenting). The
court did not find a hostile environment, however, noting that the "sexually oriented
poster displays had a de minimis effect on the plaintiff's work environment when
considered in the context of a society that condones and publicly features . . . open
displays of written and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time television,
at the cinema, and in other public places." Id. at 622; cf. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880
(holding that the plaintiff showed sufficient evidence of a hostile environment in the
workplace when she explained receiving numerous bizarre, and sometimes passion-
ate, notes from a co-worker). In contrast to Rabidue, the Ellison court was sympa-
thetic to the particular perspectives of women in American society because of
women's common concerns about sexual assault. Id. at 879. As such, the court
adopted a reasonable woman standard for judging the hostility of a plaintiffs work
environment. Id. The court argued that "a sex-blind reasonable person standard
tends to be male biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of wom-
en. Id.
151. Paetzold & O'-eary-Kelly, supra note 46, at 52.
152. This may occur, for example, when victims appear vulnerable and emotional
and react with severe psychological distress.
153. See Lucy V. Katz, Sexual Harassment and Feminist Theory: Tracing the
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Hostile environments may be expected to occur more often
in ILM situations because there are economic incentives sup-
porting their existence."54 In the ILM, co-workers are direct
competitors for promotions and other advancement opportu-
nities, making harassment one weapon to eliminate competi-
tion." Further, in the absence of effective Title VII enforce-
ment, the ILM employer may have little incentive to eradicate
harassment in the ILM, and may in fact have incentives to
promote it, because workplace harassment may be consonant
with the employer's opportunistic desires to eliminate workers
before they can recoup their investments. 14 Because racial
and sexual harassment affect primarily nontraditional workers,
these workers may be disproportionately forced to leave the
ILM without receiving the return on their investment gained
through advancement.
IV. CONCERNS AND IMPLICATIONS REGARDING TITE VII
AND ILMs
In the previous Parts of this Article we have argued that
although Title VII has allowed women and minorities to move
into entry level positions, it has not been equally successful at
facilitating their advancement to higher levels of employment.
As a result, two major negative outcomes are likely for nontra-
ditional workers. These two possibilities directly relate to the
problems of standards of proof, stereotyping, statistical evi-
dence, and hostile environment harassment.
First, fewer women and minorities will be permitted to
enter positions requiring employee investment in the form of
firm-specific skills learning.57 Women and minorities may be
disproportionately assigned to dead end staff positions because
the presence of stereotyping by employers means that employ-
ers may not recognize most members of these groups as suit-
able for ILM advancement." Similarly, employers will likely
assign fewer women and minorities to line positions that are
Lineage 20-21 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Houston Law Review)
(describing "tough" female plaintiffs who have been denied relief).
154. Refer to notes 31-36 supra and accompanying text.
155. See Glidden, supra note 149, at 1836 (describing power as a catalyst for
sexual harassment). Men may abuse this power implicitly to convey an image that
women are inferior and cannot adequately stand up to job pressures. Id. at 1837.
156. Refer to notes 31-36 supra and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, supra note 5, at 16-17 (noting that employ-
ers use stereotypes to exclude women from positions that lead to advancement, but
also providing evidence showing that these stereotypes are false).
158. Id at 16.
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part of the ILM feeder system for higher ranking positions of
authority."5 9 In other words, employers will be less likely to
incur investment costs for nontraditional workers.
Consequently, there will be large numbers of women and
minorities assigned to dead end positions who will consider
leaving because of frustration at the lack of opportunity for
advancement."6 These nontraditional employees will be un-
able to recoup specific investments they have made in the
organization, and their ability to shift to other job opportuni-
ties will depend in part on the transferability of those invest-
ments. 1' To the extent that their investments are highly
firm-specific and transfer is difficult, these frustrated workers
may continue in the ILM arrangement with little or no oppor-
tunity for advancement. This result then reinforces the stereo-
type that women and minorities are not motivated to, or do
not aspire to, the same career paths as traditional white male
employees. Those employees who are able to transfer some of
their investments to other organizations may leave the organi-
zation. This type of turnover behavior then tends to further
strengthen employers' stereotypes about the lack of long-term
commitment of women and minority employees.'62
Additionally, workers who bear the responsibility of caring
for children or other family members may determine that the
specific tradeoff between holding a dead end job and caring for
a family member favors the latter. They make this choice even
though they may have preferred career advancement had it
been available to them." Employers are likely to translate
these workers' actions into reinforcement of existing stereo-
types concerning nontraditional workers' primary concerns and
responsibilities for family caregiving. 64  The interaction
159. Id.
160. See Martin et al., supra note 33, at 26-27 (alleging that high turnover
rates for women are due to limited advancement opportunities in the dead end jobs
that are traditionally available to women).
161. Refer to note 26 supra and accompanying text.
162. See Martin et al., supra note 33, at 26-27 (noting that high turnover rates
for women give the impression of low job commitment).
163. Some firms utilize family friendly policies to assist female career advance-
ment. Rochelle Sharpe, Family Friendly Firms Don't Always Promote Females, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 29, 1994, at Bi. However, many of these companies tend to have poor
track records in promoting women. Id. Women are afraid to use these policies be-
cause they believe they will not be seriously considered for top jobs. Id.
164. Martin et al., supra note 33, at 26-27. Women are often believed to be less
dedicated than men to their jobs and careers. Id at 21. Managerial level employees
may view single women as likely to leave or get married, and married women as
likely to have children. See id. at 27 (noting that women must sacrifice marriage,
children, or both to overcome stereotypes that inhibit their promotability). Title VII
has not been effective in eradicating these notions from the workplace. See generally
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between ILMs and Title VII can therefore lead to a situation
in which women and minorities appear to choose opportunities
that do not permit them to obtain long-term career advance-
ment, thwarting the national goals of increased diversity and
equal opportunity in all organizations.
In addition to creating a situation in which fewer nontra-
ditional workers will, in the long run, be willing to enter ILM-
type employment arrangements, a second negative outcome for
women and minorities is also likely to occur. Women and mi-
norities who hold line positions-positions that feed into higher
ranking positions of authority-will tend to be subjected to
opportunistic behavior by the employer." Specifically, the
employer will recoup its investment without providing opportu-
nities for advancement because of the conscious or unconscious
perception that nontraditional workers are unsuitable for long-
term advancement within the organization.1" The employer
may also discharge these employees once its investment has
been recouped. Small numbers of women and minorities in
feeder positions means that employers will have created a
situation in which few women and minorities are deemed
qualified for ILM advancement. Instead, most candidates will
be white males, ensuring that an inordinate percentage of
white males are selected for advancement.
This view of the organization suggests that employers play
a major role in maintaining existing stereotypes concerning
qualifications and availability for mid-level and upper level
management positions for women and minorities, and that
Title VII allows this situation to occur. The disparate treat-
ment, disparate impact, and hostile environment models of
discrimination are unlikely to provide sufficient relief for
Abrams, supra note 141, at 1187 (noting that while Title VII helps women gain
entry into once closed occupations, it is not effective in eradicating many damaging
female stereotypes that prohibit career advancement); Frances E. Olsen, The Family
and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
65, 77 (Patricia Smith ed. 1993) (noting that while Title VII has helped a small
group of women achieve equality in the workplace, it has failed to change sexually
segregated employment practices). Women may be perceived as more costly to em-
ploy, and thus will tend to be overlooked for higher ranking positions that require
long-term development and commitment. See id. at 1222 (noting that employers may
discriminate against women with children by denying the employee interesting work
or refusing to award earned promotions). Firms might not choose female candidates
for executive development courses, important or powerful positions that lead to gen-
eral management, international assignments, or promotions. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that developmental experiences and career enhanc-
ing assignments that act as precursors to advancement are often not available to
women and minorities).
165. Refer to note 31 supra and accompanying text.
166. Refer to notes 163-64 supra and accompanying text.
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workers trapped in the ILM because, as previously discussed,
courts have been relatively insensitive to the particular prob-
lems that ILM employees face under Title VII.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED APPLICATION OF
TITLE VII TO ILMs
The economic incentives created by ILMs make a strong
argument favoring a revision in the interpretation of Title VII.
Failures in the ILM, as in the external market, warrant im-
proved regulation to achieve increased workplace diversity. 67
A. Standards of Proof
Although arguably adequate to monitor employment deci-
sions that take place in the ELM, Title VII's standards of
proof regarding both prima facie cases and defenses fail to
protect minority and women employees in the ILM situa-
tion.'" Compared to the protection afforded to workers at en-
try level decisions, neither the disparate treatment nor the
disparate impact model provides much assistance to those
workers who have entered the firm, have made firm-specific
investments, and have then been denied opportunities for ad-
vancement.
169
The Hicks requirement that the plaintiff in a disparate
treatment case bear an additional burden beyond showing
pretext is particularly problematic for the ILM employee. 70
Employment decisions within the ILM are made under a much
more controlled environment than those in the ELM because
the employer's uncertainty is correspondingly reduced.'
Thus, the Hicks Court's concern that employers may make
employment decisions for not readily apparent, nondiscrimina-
tory reasons should be reduced. In the ILM situation, the
plaintiff should win if she can demonstrate that the reason(s)
advanced by the employer are mere pretext for discrimination.
To allow this, Hicks should be overturned to avoid the prob-
lems it currently creates for ILM employees.
167. See HUDSON INSTITUTE, WOREFORCE 2000: WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 95 (1987) (noting that white males born in the United
States will account for only 15% of the net additions to the American work force be-
tween 1985 and 2000).
168. Refer to notes 129-38 supra and accompanying text.
169. Refer to note 31 supra and accompanying text.
170. Refer to notes 65-72 supra and accompanying text.
171. Refer to note 23 supra and accompanying text (discussing the implicit
agreement between the employer and employee in the ILM context).
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In disparate impact cases, the business necessity require-
ment should be more stringently interpreted so that legitimate
reasons for using a facially neutral selection mechanism are
insufficient to justify a mechanism that has an adverse impact
on ILM women and minorities. Further, courts must be willing
to monitor the practices of employers who operate ILMs and to
question the suitability of criteria for advancement that ILM
employers either use or impose. The use of informal criteria, in
particular, should be scrutinized. If the plaintiff plausibly dem-
onstrates that a particular informal criterion has been used in
the past, or that the formal criteria used by the employer pro-
vide no basis for screening her, then the employer presumably
is using some informal criteria despite the employer's failure to
officially recognize these criteria.'72
Courts have been reluctant to inquire into a firm's high
level employment decisions. 7 ' This is perhaps due to a
failure to recognize that ILM employers will follow their best
strategic economic interests and will therefore tend to dismiss
employees or deny access to further advancement once the em-
ployers have recovered their investment. As argued above, the
likelihood of opportunistic behavior by employers is accentuat-
ed in the case of nontraditional workers."7 The forces behind
the operation of ILMs require courts to devise rules that moti-
vate employers to fulfill the implicit agreement entered with
172. See, e.g., Churchill v. IBM, 759 F. Supp. 1089, 1091 (D.N.J. 1991) (denying
the defendant's motion for summary judgment concerning the plaintiffs claim of
discrimination in the defendant's salary and promotional practices). In Churchill, the
plaintiff was able to demonstrate that three of the men promoted to the executive
level did not appear on the resource listing of candidates for executive positions. I6.
at 1104. Under our proposed scheme, this would give rise to a presumption that
informal criteria were used by the employer. In Churchill, this evidence was used by
the plaintiff to show that the rationales offered by the defendant for salary and
promotional discrepancies between men and women were mere pretext for discrimi-
nation. Id
A recent survey indicates that although employers may not officially recognize
certain criteria for promotion, those criteria nonetheless play an important role. Dai-
ly Lab. Rep., supra note 42, at D10. Informal criteria include factors such as office
politics, personality, integrity, and familiarity with the candidate. Id. In fact, 54% of
those responding said that informal criteria were the most important criteria in
determining who was promoted, even though they do not appear on any official eval-
uations of the candidates. Id.
Organizational research also suggests that women and minorities are often ex-
cluded from promotion networking channels due to informal criteria. See, e.g.,
Herminia Ibarra, Personal Networks of Women and Minorities in Management: A
Conceptual Framework, 18 ACAD. MGMT. Ruv. 56, 56-58 (1993) (noting that informal
networking in organizations produces unique constraints on women and minorities
that negatively impact job effectiveness and career development).
173. Refer to notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
174. Refer to notes 37-46 supra and accompanying text.
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In particular, we propose that employment decisions con-
cerning promotion and advancement be understood by the
courts as implicit contracts capable of legal enforcement. For
example, in common situations in which extensive firm-specific
training is required, courts should scrutinize the employer's
decisions to a larger extent. If it appears that the employee
has substantially performed by making the firm-specific invest-
ments, the employer's breach of the implicit contract would
require the employer pay damages or specifically perform her
obligations, perhaps by awarding the employee reinstatement
and back pay.
B. Stereotyping
Stereotypes may be used by the ILM employer as either
conscious or unconscious subterfuge in limiting of advancement
opportunities for women and minorities. 75 This behavior by
the employer can occur after the employee has made invest-
ments, so that it represents opportunistic, strategic behavior by
the employer. 6 Because many of the stereotypes are wide-
spread and socially held, there may not be serious social reper-
cussions for an employer who engages in this kind of behav-
ior. 7 Lack of serious reputational injury to the employer
means there are inadequate incentives for the employer to
eradicate this barrier to advancement. 7 The courts must re-
alize that employment-related decisions in the ILM are affect-
ed at least as much by stereotyping as those in the ELM, due
to the ILM incentives for the employer to prevent employee re-
coupment of investment. Courts should realize that stereotyp-
ing can be inadvertent and unconscious but nevertheless in-
tentionally discriminatory in the sense that the stereotypes on
their face treat women or minorities differently from
175. See, e.g., Ann M. Morrison & Mary Ann Von Glinow, Women and Minori-
ties in Management, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 200, 202 (1990) (noting that upper level
managers, acting consciously or unconsciously under the influence of stereotypes,
contribute to the differential treatment of women and minorities in management).
176. Refer to note 31 supra and accompanying text
177. Refer to notes 118, 175 supra and accompanying text. Social stereotyping
can also lead to problems in sexual or racial harassment. See Robinson v. Jackson-
ville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-03 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (discussing
plaintiffs expert witness testimony concerning the impact of stereotyping and how it
inadvertently leads to sex discrimination).
178. See Morrison & Von Glinow, supra note 175, at 202 (suggesting that a
manager may choose to discriminate if such action will be viewed positively by oth-
ers in a position to reward that manager).
1995] TITLE VII 1551
HeinOnline  -- 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1551 1994-1995
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
others.17 9
For the courts to deal specifically with the stereotyping
problem, we argue that it cannot be enough that the courts,
are willing to evaluate the selection and evaluation decisions
after a worker's entry to the firm to the same degree that the
original hiring decisions are scrutinized. Instead, we propose
that employment decisions within the ILM be subjected to a
higher level of scrutiny. In addition, we propose the BFOQ
defense"8 be disallowed in decisions that occur within the
ILM context. As previously indicated, no employer may use a
BFOQ for race.'8' Thus, we are arguing for the abolishment
of BFOQs for gender. If an individual woman truly cannot per-
form the job, -the employer can articulate this as the legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for not advancing her. As a
class, however, women should not be eliminated from ad-
vancement because of BFOQ stereotyping.
C. Statistical Proof of Discrimination
In the absence of an explicit policy, both the systemic dis-
parate treatment and the disparate impact models require a
sufficient statistical showing giving rise to an inference of a
pattern or practice of discrimination.' This proof by the
plaintiff requires comparing the number of women and minori-
ties actually selected by the firm and the relevant pool from
which selections could be made."s At higher levels of the or-
ganization, the economics of ILMs suggest that this reference
pool, and the number of women or minorities within it, could
be rather small." 4 Additionally, over time the available pool
at lower levels will become smaller as nontraditional workers
become increasingly aware of the small expectation for ad-
vancement.85 For those workers who enter such positions
and make investments in firm-specific training but are left
179. See Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Other People: The Impact of Power on Ste-
reotyping, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 621, 626 (1993) (noting that stereotyping is viewed
by cognitive psychologists as intentional in the sense that humans have the capacity
to think of others as 'members of a category or as unique individuals").
180. Refer to notes 95-102 supra and accompanying text.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
182. Refer to notes 124-28 supra and accompanying text.
183. Refer to notes 124-38 supra and accompanying text.
184. Refer to note 129 supra and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Greenhaus et al., supra note 121, at 68 (noting that blacks who
have internalized negative assessments of themselves may not see the point in pur-
suing career development); Martin et al., supra note 33, at 28 (noting that women,
in response to claims that they lack necessary management skills, may consequently
become less career oriented and less ambitious than men).
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with no possibility of advancement, small sample size would
make it difficult to prove discrimination on the basis of any
systematic pattern or practice." This limitation on the appli-
cation of the systemic disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact models should be specifically acknowledged by the courts.
The need for statistical evidence should be reduced in these
circumstances so that comparative and anecdotal evidence is
given greater weight. Additionally, courts must not discount
statistical significance when it occurs for small samples or
small numbers of minority and women employees.
D. The ILM Work Environment
Courts should also recognize that as nontraditional work-
ers enter previously unattainable positions, the possibility of
racial and sexual harassment is enhanced."' 7 A hostile work
environment would aggravate the problems presented in the
ILM framework by making it more difficult for women and
minorities to remain with the organization long enough to
recover their investments or to perform well enough in the
organization to advance. The effects of the hostile work envi-
ronment in this context could, therefore, be twofold. First,
more women and minorities could opt out of any labor market
that would require them to make firm-specific investments.
Because firm-specific training is normally associated with high-
er paying jobs,"s such a situation would direct nontraditional
workers into lower paying jobs and would create the corre-
sponding societal problems evidenced in the literature concern-
ing primary and secondary markets. Second, a hostile work
environment would also facilitate strategic employer behavior
by making it more difficult for those employees that have
made investments to stay with the firm long enough to reach
the investment recoupment stage in their careers. The special
problems that hostile work environments can create in ILMs
suggest that courts must scrutinize alleged harassment of this
type more closely in ILM environments.
Because ILM employers have strong economic incentives to
maintain hostile work environments for women or minorities,
courts must use Title VII to provide appropriate disincentives.
Courts could require ILM employers to remedy the hostile
186. Refer to notes 130-38 supra and accompanying text.
187. Refer to text accompanying notes 154-56 supra.
188. See Cappelli & Cascio, supra note 70, at 862 (suggesting a mathematical
correlation between higher wages and firm-specific knowledge).
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environment to avoid liability, or they could hold ILM employ-
ers strictly liable for hostile environment harassment created
by co-workers. Additionally, courts could eliminate the reason-
ableness requirement of the hostile environment case, thereby
allowing ILM plaintiffs to prove harassment by demonstrating
that they personally considered the behavior unwelcome and
that it altered their conditions of employment."
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite thirty years of antidiscrimination regulation under
Title VII, women and minorities continue to experience a glass
ceiling that prohibits them from advancing to high level posi-
tions of authority in organizations. We argue that Title VII
has actually played a role in this lack of advancement. Be-
cause Title VII was interpreted to focus on entry level posi-
tions for women and minorities, it is arguably not suitable, as
currently interpreted, for ILM situations. Without either judi-
cial or legislative recognition of the special problems nontradi-
tional workers face in the ILM, and without concomitant adap-
tation of Title VII to address these problems, women and mi-
norities will continue to face a glass ceiling that will frustrate
societal efforts to improve diversity at all levels of the
workplace.
189. See, e.g., Paetzold & Shaw, supra note 149, at 684 (recommending that
courts drop the existing focus on reasonableness and instead concentrate on fostering
equal opportunities for all employees by eliminating behavior detrimental to individu-
al women).
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